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Abstract. From spyware to ransomware to leakware, the world is on
the verge of getting struck by a myriad of advanced attacks. Security re-
searchers’ main objective is protecting the assets that a person/company
possesses. They are in a constant battle in this cyber war facing attackers’
malicious intents. To compete in this arm race against security breaches,
we propose an insight into plausible attacks especially Doxware (called
also leakware). We present a quantification model that explores Win-
dows file system in search of valuable data. It is based on some solutions
provided in the literature for natural language processing such as term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF). The best top 15 file
“contestants” will be then exfiltrated over the Internet to the attacker’s
server. Our approach delivers an observation of the evolution of malware
throughout the last years. It enables users to prevent their sensitive in-
formation being exposed to potential risks.
Keywords: Doxware · Asset · Exfiltration · Content Analysis · TF-IDF
· NLP.
1 Introduction
A Pact with the Devil is always made when a virus executes its payload on the
victim’s computer as Bond et al. state:“The arms race between propagation and
defence will continue ad infinitum” [8].
Putting computer security on sounder footing, researchers seek to decrease
attacks on companies and end users. Startling news are conveyed in Symantec’s
latest report published in 2019 [2]. Even though cryptojacking is down, but not
out, targeted attacks blossomed by 78% in 2018. Cloud security and formjacking
remain a concern for companies.
Cyber Security kill chain model consists of the attack’s structure progressing
through several phases. It begins with a reconnaissance and, once the control
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over the victim’s machine is acquired, the payload is executed. This payload
marks the objectives of cyber criminals.
To respond to those cyber-attacks, several strategies exist. A well-known
malware is ransomware, a type of software that encrypts users documents asking
for a ransom in exchange of the key used for encryption. One countermeasure is
the calculation of Shannon’s entropy of user’s files [14, 15, 22]. In fact, if they are
encrypted their value fluctuates around 8. However, this is a reactive solution.
Our goal is to be a step ahead of the attacker to prevent security breaches. Thus,
it will give us a better understanding of the possible intrusions.
Analysts also joined the uphill battle against cyber-attacks. In fact, it is not
affecting end users only, governmental concern is on the rise since it compromises
the security and serenity of a country. The ultimate goal of any company is pro-
tecting its resources: the data. Data is the most valuable asset a person could
acquire. Indeed, it has and is being used for many purposes by the attacker:
lucrative opportunities enabling them a monetary gain. For example, blackmail-
ing victims in displaying their private pictures to the public. Company wise, it
could be selling the information gathered to a concurrent one, which will lead
to millions of dollars in term of losses.
Risk evaluation is a necessity in all the cases. Companies should take into
account the potential danger of disgruntled employees that can jeopardize their
supreme interests. Initial leakware threat emerged in the late 2015 with Chimeras
ransomware [3]. However, no evidence prove the exfiltration of any personal
information. To the best of our knowledge, no previous research was made on a
plausible doxware attack and its feasibility. For all the aforementioned reasons,
we endeavor presenting Doxware techniques that could be used for victim assets’
extortion.
Outline The paper is structured as follows. The context and language pro-
cessing are presented in Section 2. The state of the art of is described in Section 3.
Our proof of concept (POC) is developed in Section 4. Protection mechanisms
are provided in Section 5. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 Context
2.1 From Ransomware To Doxware
Ransomware is a specific type of malware that encrypts victims’ files [19]. A
second type is ransom-locker that blocks the access to the desktop without en-
cryption’s process. Data’s retrieval can be possible if the ransom required by the
attacker is paid. Our main concern in this paper is crypto ransomware since they
present a higher threat than locker ransomware.
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Fig. 1. Ransomware Vs Doxware.
Figure 1 presents ransomware and doxware workflow. Three main stages ap-
pear in both malware (phase 1, 2 and 3). The only difference resides in “valuable
files hunting” followed by an exfiltration of the acquired data (phase 2D and 3D).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies were made on this specific type
of malware and it was only mentioned by researches as an advanced threat [10,
18, 20, 23].
Our proposed approach focuses on the file evaluation for score computation.
The exfiltration phase will be presented in our future work. Doxware samples
were not found on public repositories (VirusShare, MalwareDB, ...) or blogs,
therefore, dynamic and static analysis were not carried out.
2.2 Data Formats Choice
Different data formats exist nowadays that are stored in a computer. They can
be classified into three main categories:
1. Textual Documents: They represent files that contain mostly data in the
form of a sequence of words or alphabetic characters. For example, contracts,
agreements, company’s balance sheet, medical records...
2. Pictures: Designs or representations made by various means (such as paint-
ing, drawing, or photography). For instance, a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI), gradient descent convergence, trip pictures.
3. Videos: A recording of a motion picture or television program for playing
through a television set (movies, video clip, news). These have to be personal
in order to blackmail the victim in paying the ransom.
Nearly all processing methods in the literature for face recognition or body
detection are based on machine learning algorithms [7, 25]. Some additional in-
formation are mandatory to be able to recognize bodies, clothes, poses...
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Many drawbacks reside in these approaches such as their weight: complex
algorithms requiring considerable computation power. This means many false
positives cannot be tolerated. Sending 50 Mb video that does not encompass
sensitive information represents a huge loss for the attacker. For example, many
packets will be transmitted over the network and cannot go unnoticed. Therefore,
a compromise between efficiency and stealthiness is needed. Moreover, pictures
of people represent often a red line since you are affecting their privacy that
means they will feel threatened. For all the reasons cited above, our proof of
concept developed in this paper is based on textual documents analysis, specifi-
cally contracts.
2.3 Natural Language Processing (NLP)
– Bag-Of-Words (BOW): It is a simple technique that is part of NLP. The idea
relies on regrouping words by their occurrences.
“Mankind must put an end to war before war puts an end to mankind.”
The result will be : (“mankind” : 2),( “must”: 1),( “put”: 1),( “an”: 2),(“end”:
2),(“to”: 2),(“war”: 2),(“before”: 1),(“puts”: 1). Nevertheless, this technique
has some well-known flaws. Some words, existent in any kind of documents
(”the”,”an”,”is”,”are”...) called stop words, are not representative of the
document itself compared to others. Their frequency will steal the light, as a
consequence, non-relevant words will identify these documents. Hence, this
technique will be backed up by the TF-IDF transformation addressing the
problem encountered in BOW [26, 31].
– TF-IDF This process has the Bag Of Words as a basis but with an improved
layer. To begin with, a corpus is needed, because the process compares doc-
uments one to another. The bigger the corpus, better specificities of the
documents can be extracted.
IDF : for a word i, a corpus of documents dj (with j the index of the target
document), and |D| the total number of documents in the corpus, we define:
idfi,j = log(
|D|
|dj : ti ∈ dj| )
For a given word i, its personal score is the logarithm of the number of
documents divided by the number of documents that contain this word i.
When the number of times a word is present in a document is significant,
the value obtained in the logarithm is very close to 1, so idfi will be close to
0. For a document dj and a word, the score of this word in this particular
document has a value of:
tfidfi,j = tfi,j ∗ idfi
having tfi,j the number of occurrences of the word i in the document dj.
The idfi coefficient highlights rare words found only in few documents, even
though not frequent enough, they carry some meaning and should be visi-
ble [21, 27].
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– Latent Dirichlet Allocation LDA: In layman’s terms, each document can be
described by a distribution of topics and each topic can be described by
a distribution of words. From a corpus we create the topics, so that with
a single document we can link it with the appropriate topic. Considering a
corpus of documents, the algorithm tries to build the topics from the content
of this corpus. In the end of the execution, for each document, you get the
list of the probabilities for this document to belong to the various topics
[1...k]. It uses Bayesian variables to determine those probabilities. However,
the number of topics are given as in input. It was not used in our current
POC.
3 State of the art
3.1 Data Value
Google Scholar provides more than 5 million research papers regarding sensitive
data. It is not limited to a particular field but represents a common concern for
a myriad of sectors (healthcare, telecom, automotive, energy, ..). For example,
mental health care is a delicate subject that could ruin a person’s reputation
under malicious manipulation. Netherlands data breach came mostly from the
medical sector (29%) [1].
Sensitive information depends on the equipment being used. For instance,
Yang et al. considered that the following items represent significant data on
Android OS: Unique Device ID, Location, Phone number, Contact book, SMS
messages and Calendar [30]. These elements carry a huge advantage. In fact, each
cell phone possesses this data and any application could access it via simple API
calls. Another method would be taint analysis that detects flows upcoming from
known sources (IMEI of a cellphone) to untrusted sinks like the Internet. Track-
ing data is therefore a straightforward process in Android Devices. A similar
tool developed by Sun et al. enables a multilevel information flow tracking by
utilizing registers for taint storage, having only a 15% overhead on the CPU [24].
It presents an enhancement of TaintDroid developed by in terms of taint storage
and resource consumption [9]. Considerable research is being conducted in this
field as in [6, 11, 13, 28, 29].
On Android OS, attackers know what they are looking and where to find
it, like extracting the GPS location of the victim. Yet, these sensitive elements
cannot be predefined on a computer level. Indeed, sensitive data is only relevant
to a particular end user (could be a project for a student or a painting for an
artist). It exists in a variety of formats and is stored in different locations for
each user.
Data’s value is translated by the measure taken by a company to protect it.
For instance, Zhu et al. provided TaintEraser a new tool that tracks sensitive
user data as it flows through applications [32]. They are one of the pioneers in
developing data protection from leakage on Windows OS. Their taint propaga-
tion was based on instruction and function level. They evaluated their solution
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on Notepad, Yahoo!Messenger and the Internet Explorer where they presented
accurate results based on taint propagation. However, TaintEraser can be by-
passed via data transfer in shared memory. Loginova et al. suggested to use
cryptographic software to carry out on-the-fly encryption [17]. They stated that
it represents the most effective approach to overcome data leakage and to protect
the information.
3.2 Data exfiltration
Data exfiltration is a security breach where this information is disclosed and can
be published via the attacker’s will. Researchers have long been interested in
this domain since it can threaten a company or individual’s wellbeing. Giani et
al. revealed that the bandwidth constraints depends not only on the amount of
data exchanged but also on the media being used [12]. Indeed, since 2006 little
has changed. Leakage methods remain the same (FTP, SSH, email, ...).
Al-Bataineh et al. presented the detection of malicious data exfiltration in
web traffic [5]. Their solution is based on analyzing initially the content of an
HTTP POST request (using Shannon entropy) to check whether it is encrypted
or not. Additional features were extracted to perform machine learning on the
data gathered for malware classification.
Ahmed et al. tuned and trained a machine learning algorithm to detect
anomalies in DNS queries [4]. Numerous elements are considered like Total count
of characters in Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), count of uppercase char-
acters, count of characters in sub-domains, entropy,... Less than than 5% of false
positive rate is achieved in their work. Another example is based on Liu et al.
work, where they were able to detect data theft by analyzing the content of the
data being sent to generate a signature [16]. They extracted the information
from videos via wavelets enabling them to identify covert communication using
Hausdorff Distance.
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4 Proposed methodology
Fig. 2. Procedure’s Workflow.
Procedure’s Workflow is presented in figure 2. It will be thoroughly explained in
the following sections.
4.1 Usable Corpus
Leakware or doxware subject is very broad and can be interpreted in many ways,
whether it infects a personal or a professional machine, an individual user or a
company. Our preference from among choices is the evaluation of professional
documents (that can be found on both machines). Since a variety of extensions
exist for textual analysis (.txt, .docx, .pdf, .rtf , .wpd, .odt...) we decided at first
to restrain the study domain on .txt, .docx and .pdf files.
The content of a textual document bears its ultimate value. Therefore, the se-
quence of characters should be extracted for further analysis. PDF revealed later
on to be quite a challenge: in fact, it could be a scanned document. Therefore,
existent tools for words extraction will not be adequate. A possible solution is
treating it as an image, extracting its content with the help of an Optical Char-
acter Recognition (OCR) and Tesseract (an open source OCR engine). However,
many problems occurred regarding PDF files that led to discard them in our
Proof of Concept. De facto, each page of the PDF document is converted into a
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.png image. The ratio of PDF to image can be 1/30, a memory consuming pro-
cess. The program gets importantly less stealthy. In addition to that, another
noticeable problem emerged: longer processing time compared to .txt.
Concerning the Textual Documents, a usable corpus is created of vari-
ous extensions (.txt, .docx) to implement the different solutions mentioned in
the State of The Art. They are downloaded from onecle.com and contracts-
finder.service.gov.uk. Additional noise files are gathered from Google Scholar,
online courses and our own documents. This database of files can be extended
in the future by adding different topics.
4.2 Evaluation Algorithm
The evaluation algorithm built depends on some parameters of the document
that the program is analyzing. It is divided in two parts: one related to the
attacker, as in generating intelligent lexicons in order to focus on the sub-
jects/topics she wants to exfiltrate, and another on the victim side, evaluating
the documents of the victim to send them over the network.
To accomplish these tasks four elements are required in the analysis program:
Lexical Generation, Document Content Evaluation, Password files Evaluation
and Meta Data Evaluation.
Lexical Generation On the attackers machine, a pre-processing is made for
lexicons generation of any desired subject. To fulfill this task, a corpus of various
documents based on the specific subject (.docx or .txt) is required. This topic
represents the files that the attacker will be searching for on the victim’s machine
once infected.
Initially, TF-IDF transformation is applied on the union of documents in the
corpus. The TOP -n (n an integer of your choice) results represent the words
having the best score for each document, yet not all of them are equally impor-
tant. For example, some acronyms like “rdc” will not be valuable on the victims
pc. Since the transformation made has as an objective finding representative
words for each document, then an acronym cannot be generalized to define a
topic. Indeed, it is not relevant for the whole Lexicon as it must represent all
documents of a specific subject.
The next step relies on creating a function that associates each word in the
lexicon to an importance “score”.
Let wi be a word that represents the target subject. Let n be the number
of words taken into consideration by a document (TOP n words with highest
TF-IDF score). The word wi has a pi,j position in the document j. Its value is
built as following:
Sc(wi, j) =
n− pi,j
n
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As a result, the total score Sci will be :
Sci =
n∑
j=1
Sc(wi, j) =
n∑
j=1
n− pi,j
n
Sci is divided by n for normalization purposes so that any word can have
a maximum score of 1. In the example of lexicon that will follow, the word
“1look” arose and represents an important element in the subject corpus we
acquired. Indeed, it has an important score for its own document but globally it
is not representative of contract documents. A part of a lexicon produced and
used on the victims machine is presented below: (1look,0.090) (company,0.6)
(agreement,0.690) (section,0.272) (purchaser,0.181) (shares,0.199) (shall,0.736)
(closing,0.090) (material,0.018) (date,0.009) (buyer,0.181) (acquisition,0.045).
Document Content Evaluation On the victim’s side, the lexicons are already
hidden in the malware source code and they will used to process a content score
which will be merged with a meta data score for a final evaluation score. A
modified bag of words is implemented. At first, a dictionary containing every
word of the document with its number of occurrences is extracted. The initial
value of the content score is 0.
Let CS be this content score, Li the score of the word i of the lexicon being
studied, n the number of words in the lexicon and occi the number of occurrences
of the word i in the document analyzed.
CS =
n∑
i=1
Li ∗ occi
Password Evaluation Two methods are used for password evaluation:
1. A comparison of the words existing in a document is made with the 25 most
common passwords (gathered from to Symantec). For each occurrence, the
naive score is increased by one.
2. Hunting for password common patterns: for instance, if a word contains more
than 8 characters including uppercase, lowercase, numbers, special characters
and so on.
– length : length of the word, caped between 6 and 16.
– presence of more than two uppercase and more than one lowercase: +3.
– presence of uppercase, lowercase and number: +3.
– presence of a special character: +8.
– presence of a known business (such as “facebook”, “netix” and so on):
+5
Then we sum them all before dividing by 10.
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Meta Data Evaluation Fifteen meta data can be accessed and extracted
from a Word Document. Those are: author, category, comments, content status,
created, identifier, keywords, language, last modified by, last printed, modified,
revision, subject, title and version. However, most of the meta data are not filled
in (the content is null), therefore, the only ones kept are the most relevant which
are the number of revision, created, modified, last printed.
The algorithm Valuable File Hunting (VFHA) summarizes the steps devel-
oped in our paper.
4.3 Solution’s Design
1. Initially: Lexicon Generation of Contract Topic (line 2 in VFHA).
2. Then: parsing the target file system looking for .txt and .docx extensions
(line 18 in VFHA).
3. File Score
(a) .txt: Its content is extracted and vocabulary analyzed. Each word is
compared with a lexicon previously created that contains recurrent and
relevant words in a contract based document. An additional comparison
is made to spot if there is any noun that appeared similar to a construc-
tion of a password. Either a common one (“passwd” for instance) or
since it includes special characters, uppercase, lowercase and numbers in
a string. For every method called, a score between 0 and 5 is returned. In
the end, those scores are summed in order to have a total that represents
the value of the file taken into consideration. If the score is not null, it
means that the document may yield value. Therefore, we add the file
to a dictionary of potentially valuable ones linked to its score (line 3 in
VFHA)..
(b) .docx: The same procedure is done for the .docx files. However, an addi-
tional step is made for the meta data analysis. The significant metadata
are the number of revision, creation date, modification date and the date
when it was last printed. They will be added to the total sum represent-
ing the value of a document (line 3 and 9 in VFHA).
4. “Summarize” step: Each document has a total score that has been assigned,
so the list of tuple (path, score) is sorted according to the value obtained,
where the attacker chooses which ones he/she wants to extract. For instance
the first 50 files (line 23 and 24 in VFHA).
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Algorithm Valuable File Hunting VFH
1: procedure Algorithm 1
2: Topic Lexicon← { lexicon generator (Corpus of same Topic: Contract) }
3: def analyse content(File f):
4: for word ∈ f do
5: if word ∈ Topic Lexicon then
6: f score+ = score(word) ∗ number occurrences
7: return f score/len(f)
8:
9: def analyse metadata(File f):
10: if f.core properties.revision > 1 then
11: f metadata score+ = 5
12: else if f.created == “2019” then
13: f metadata score+ = 1
14: else if ... then
15: ...
16: return Sum(f metadata score)
17:
18: Parse the File System
19: if FileExtension ∈ .txt or .docx then
20: FileList← {Analyse MetaData and Content}
21: else
22: Continue;
23: Sort FileList by highest Score
24: Send n first valuable files to the attacker’s server (future work)
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4.4 Lexicon Generation
Fig. 3. An Example of Lexicon with the associated Scores.
The chart presented in figure 3 shows the most common words in a contract
document are: “shall”, “partnership”, “agreement” and also “section”. Indeed,
the corpus gathered is previously identified as a contract type document, which
is an advantage allowing us to perform relatively simple algorithm to determine
whether a document belongs to this category or not. Although, law documents
acquire also an important score and may be also as valuable as a contract.
4.5 Valuable Files Chase
Personal Computer Two versions of the algorithm are tested. The first one,
heavier program since it uses scikit learn library, outputs the valuable documents
in 126 seconds. During the execution, 3578 readable documents were found that
had a non null score.
The second version is lighter because the scikit learn library is substituted
by functions we created. Since it is not optimized, 242 seconds are required to
perform a full disk analysis. Yet, the program is lighter than the initial version.
Virtual Machine A Windows 7 Virtual Machine is created for the proof of
concept. It holds 50 noise documents and 25 important files. After running the
algorithm, 15 files are recovered. Among those there were six false positives, and
5 were Windows configuration files. To gain better results, specific Windows file
system path can be removed from the file system traversal, in addition to Read-
Me related documents. The time the victim suspects something the exfiltration
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process would be to an end, and the list of documents are being or sent to the
attacker.
5 Security Recommendations
Protection against malware attacks, specially zero days, is a challenge for all
researchers. Residual risk remains: de facto, despite various countermeasures
employed by a party, an attacker can always find a way to penetrate the system
(he/she still risks to be detected). If committed, anyone can reach their malicious
intents. However, our goal is to complicate the intrusion task, detect it if possible,
rather than handling it to the attackers on a golden plate. Users should know the
existent vulnerabilities to see what patches can be used to circumvent malevolent
attacks. Some countermeasure can be deployed by users to protect their data
from being exfiltrated:
1. Honeypot Folders: They can be created in any environment, regardless the
operating system used. Since doxware will traverse the whole file system
looking for assets, any process or thread that will pass through this lure folder
can be immediately flagged then stopped. A drawback would be malware’s
multi-threading techniques, it can still be exposed but after a certain epsilon
time.
2. Data Tainting: Sensitive data in a computer is extremely private and de-
pends on the end users, unlike Android OS (IMEI, GPS location,... exis-
tent on all mobiles). Therefore, a general protection model is impossible
to develop in real life. Yet, each individual can add a layer, a taint, on his
preferred/sensitive information. Thus, each exfiltration attempt over the net-
work will be detected. Nonetheless, a person can have an explosion of tainted
data that may slow down the system.
3. Data Encryption: It remains a robust way adopted by the global community.
Indeed, brute-forcing the encryption key can take decades. Even though an
attacker acquired the encrypted files, he/she cannot menace the victims or
blackmail them since no access to the decrypted data is possible.
6 Conclusion
We have discussed in this paper the potential danger of sensitive data localiza-
tion and quantification that can be carried out by a Doxware malware. Windows
OS is the target system throughout the experiments. A proof of concept is de-
veloped based on contract topic and passwords hunt. To accomplish this tasks,
state of the art methods were used such as TF-IDF and Bag of Words in addition
to a document’s meta data. The associated score of each document is calculated
then normalized. To identify new target topics, few samples of files regarding
the same topic are needed. Even if the victim finds out he/she got hacked, the
person will not have the means to reach the attacker or react to this intrusion.
New options can be added as building bricks such as PDF and Images analysis
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which will strengthen the offensive invasion in attacker’s point of view. Reducing
false positive rate can be done by eliminating Windows system path and choos-
ing randomly N last visited files in Windows’ Quick Access. 40% of important
files can be collected, by relying on a straightforward mechanism, and ready for
exfiltration. Threats arising from this cyberwarfare are exponential. Therefore,
end users should be aware of the possible attacks especially attack vectors in
order to avoid and circumvent them protecting their assets.
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